Inglês passage one



Baixar 117.31 Kb.
Encontro26.07.2016
Tamanho117.31 Kb.






Inglês




PASSAGE ONE


Leaders

Enter Hamas



Now more than ever, Israelis and Palestinians need the world’s help


NO MATTER whether they have actually won, the mere fact that the Islamists of Hamas were taking part in this week’s Palestinian elections marks a perilous new turn in the history of the conflict in Palestine. If Israel could not make peace with a secular national-liberation movement such as Yasser Arafat’s Palestine Liberation Organization, what hope of dealing with a radical Islamic movement that is rooted in the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood? Fear of radical Islam was one reason for Yitzhak Rabin’s decision in 1993 to allow Mr Arafat and the PLO to return from exile to the occupied West Bank and Gaza. Rabin hoped to make peace with the nationalists before the rise of radical Islam made compromise impossible. On the face of it, that strategy has now failed.

New democrats, old anti-Semites

The Hamas charter calls on Islam to “obliterate” Israel, rules out negotiation and says no part of historic Palestine can ever be given up. Citing the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, a notorious forgery, it blames Jewish money for the French revolution, the communist revolution and the first and second world wars. Though claiming kinship with the PLO, Hamas opposed the founding of the Palestinian Authority (PA) under the Oslo accords, together with all subsequent attempts to negotiate a two-state solution. It has spent the past decade – long before the eruption of the recent intifada – conducting suicide bombings against Israeli civilians. A series of these on the eve of Israel’s 1996 election was designed, successfully, to ensure that Simon Peres, a labour dove, lost power to a hawkish Likud under Binyamin Netanyahu.

Following this week’s election, Hamas will for the first time have members in the Palestinian parliament, and perhaps even control it. That, many people will say, is what democracy is all about, and therefore a good thing. Hamas is genuinely popular among Palestinians both for its fight against Israel and for being largely free of the corruption that riddles the PA. Since Arafat’s death and the hapless performance of his successor, Mahmoud Abbas, the PA has anyway been a feeble creature, incapable of fulfilling its obligations under the international “road map”, such as disarming terrorist organizations. Bringing Hamas inside the tent will at least make the PA representative – and so, perhaps, more effective.

Effective, though, at what? Certainly not at disarming the terrorist organizations: Hamas is itself the foremost of those and has already refused to put aside its weapons. Arguably, it will make the PA more effective as government, especially in the chaotic Gaza strip, where since Israel’s withdrawal last summer Hamas has shown far more discipline than Fatah, its national rival. The main question, however, is whether Hamas in power will support peace negotiations with Israel or, staying loyal to its charter, resume suicide bombings and rule out talking altogether.

Here the evidence is mixed. In the run-up to the election, Hamas has shown a more moderate side, emphasizing its record in education and welfare, and abating its threats to obliterate the Jewish state. Some of its leaders have hinted at the possibility of talking to Israel, even of a long-term truce that might one day solidify into peace. To the extent that this reflects genuine pragmatism rather than electioneering, it should be encouraged. It is worth recalling that the PLO was also once committed to Israel’s destruction. It was brought into diplomacy by a process of conditional dialogue: in return for a seat at the table Mr Arafat accepted the principle of a two-state solution and forswore violence. So long as Israel and the world are strict about these conditions, nothing is to be lost by seeing whether the same strategy can work with the Islamists.

But there are two problems. One is that Hamas may be tempted to copy Hizbullah, the Islamists in Lebanon, who have found a way to have their cake and eat it too. Hizbullah leaders sit as elected representatives in Lebanon’s parliament but maintain their private army and still vow to destroy Israel. Another is that many Palestinians, especially those in Hamas, are liable to be unexcited by the offer of a place at the peace table in return for good behaviour. As in Israel, the “peace process” initiated by the apparent Rabin-Arafat breakthrough in 1993 has ended in disillusion. Many Palestinians doubt that endless talking can earn them a state, given Israel’s unending settlement-building in the West Bank and Gaza. And given unending Palestinian violence, many Israelis wonder whether the Palestinians really accept Israel’s permanence.

Put flesh on that vision, Mr Bush

Winning converts for peaceful dialogue will therefore require some serious international diplomacy, of which there has been almost none since the collapse of Bill Clinton’s Camp David summit more than five years ago. Mr Bush has a “vision” of an independent Palestine. But how big? And what about Jerusalem and refugees? In the so-called road-map, the emphasis is on gradualism: step-by-step measures culminating in further negotiation, with neither side ever knowing what sort of deal to expect at the end of it all. The defect of this approach is that moderates on each side have to persuade their respective camps to trust in the good intentions of the other side. And both camps have ample reasons to withhold that trust.



The moderates now need something much more tangible to sell: not a process but a destination on which the outside world has put its definite imprimatur. The basis for just this exists in the “parameters” Mr Clinton proposed after Camp David: a Palestinian state in Gaza plus 95% or so of the West Bank; a shared capital in Jerusalem; Palestinian sovereignty over the Temple Mount; Israeli sovereignty over the western wall; and a right for Palestinian refugees to return to the West Bank and Gaza but not to pre-1967 Israel. Mr Bush should make these his own and let the “quartet” (America, Russia, the European Union and the United Nations) throw its official weight behind them. Once Israelis and Palestinians are told the true price of peace, there will be an outcry in both camps. But they need to know at same time what peace will look like, and cost. A majority might then be willing to vote for it.
THE ECONOMIST

January 28th – February 3rd 2006

INSTRUÇÕES
As questões a seguir são relativas ao conteúdo e ao significado do texto acima, após ter lido atentamente todo o texto, escolha a resposta correta para cada questão. As respostas devem ser todas baseadas no que é afirmado, ou está implícito, no texto. Lembre–se que somente UMA OPÇÃO é correta.


  1. No primeiro capítulo (linhas 1 à 10) deste artigo os editores dizem que




    1. o fato de o Hamas simplesmente ter participado das eleições palestinas marca uma nova e perigosa reviravolta no conflito, pois se Israel pode selar a paz com um movimento secular como a Organização para a Libertação da Palestina como não poderá fazê-lo com extremistas islâmicos.

    2. não foi por medo do Movimento para a Libertação da Palestina que Yitzhak Rabin permitiu que Yasser Arafat voltasse do exílio para a Faixa de Gaza.

    3. a estratégia de Yitzhak Rabin de fazer um compromisso de paz com os extremistas islâmicos antes que o Movimento para a Libertação da Palestina voltasse do exílio para a Faixa de Gaza não surtiu o efeito esperado.

    4. o fato de o Hamas simplesmente ter participado das últimas eleições palestinas, não importando se realmente ganharam ou não, marca uma reviravolta perigosa no conflito palestino-israelense, pois se Rabin tinha esperança de um acordo de paz com os nacionalistas antes da ascensão dos radicais islâmicos, sua estratégia falhou.



  1. In the first sentence of this article, the word ‘actually’ - paragraph 1 - line 1 means:




    1. really

    2. presently

    3. at present

    4. reality



  1. On line 10 of paragraph 1 – the word compromise means in Portuguese




    1. compromisso

    2. concessão mútua

    3. comprometer

    4. agressão mútua




  1. Parágrafo 2 - linhas 12 a 22 – The Economist diz que a carta do Hamas




    1. refutando os Protocolos dos Patriarcas de Sião, fonte de pesquisa internacionalmente reconhecida, culpa o dinheiro judeu pela revolução francesa, a revolução comunista e as duas guerras mundiais.

    2. conclama o Islã a destruir Israel, exclui qualquer negociação e diz que a Palestina histórica deve ser esquecida.

    3. citando os Protocolos dos Patriarcas de Sião, uma notória falsificação, culpa o dinheiro judeu pela Revolução Francesa, a revolução comunista e as duas Guerras Mundiais.

    4. conclama o Islã a conviver com Israel, inclui negociações com Israel e diz que a Palestina histórica não pode ser esquecida.



  1. No segundo parágrafo – linhas 12 a 22 a Revista The Economist diz também que




    1. apesar de alegar parentesco com a OLP, o Hamas se opôs à fundação da Autoridade Palestina e passou a última década antes do começo da recente intifada , enviando homens-bomba contra civis israelenses.

    2. o Hamas se opôs à fundação da Autoridade Palestina alegando não ter relação nenhuma com a OLP e passou a última década antes do começo da recente intifada , enviando homens-bomba contra autoridades israelenses.

    3. apesar de alegar parentesco com a OLP, o Hamas não se opôs à fundação da Autoridade Palestina e não realizou nenhum ataque suicida contra civis israelenses.

    4. o Hamas não se opôs à fundação da Autoridade Palestina alegando não ter relação nenhuma com a OLP e passou a última década antes do começo da última intifada , enviando homens-bomba contra autoridades israelenses.



  1. No terceiro parágrafo, linhas 23 a 32, os editores da Revista dizem que




    1. por ter perdido as últimas eleições,o Hamas não terá representatantes no parlamento palestino e isso é democrático muitos dirão. O Hamas por ser genuinamente popular entre os palestinos, tanto por sua luta contra Israel como por não ser corrupto como a AP, será uma boa aquisição para a tenda de negociações e tornará a AP menos representativa e mais eficaz.

    2. Depois das últimas eleições, o Hamas terá pela primeira vez membros no parlamento palestino e muitos dirão que isso é democracia. O Hamas sendo genuinamente popular entre os palestinos tanto por apoiar Israel como por não ser corrupto como a AP será muito bem vindo à tenda de negociações tornando a AP mais eficaz.

    3. Em seguida às eleições desta semana o Hamas terá pela primeira vez membros no parlamento palestino, um fato democrático, muitos dirão. O Hamas não é genuinamente popular entre os palestinos, pois não apóia Israel e não é corrupto como a AP mas será de grande valia na tenda de negociações tornando a AP mais representativa e talvez menos corrupta.

    4. em seguida às eleições desta semana, o Hamas terá pela primeira vez membros no parlamento palestino e isso é democracia, muitos dirão. O Hamas é genuinamente popular entre os palestinos tanto por sua luta contra Israel como também por não ser corrupto como a AP. Por isso trazer o Hamas para dentro da tenda de negociações tornará a AP pelo menos mais representativa e assim, talvez mais eficaz.


  1. Paragraph 4 - line 36 - the meaning of the word withdrawal is:




    1. arrival
    2. pullout

    3. progress

    4. entrance







  1. Paragraph 5 - lines 43 to 45 - the sentence Some of its leaders have hinted at the possibility of talking to Israel, even of a long-term truce that might one day solidify into peace means that




    1. some of the Hamas leaders have denied the possibility of talking to Israel and of a long-term truce.

    2. some of the Hamas leaders are in favour of talking to Israel but have denied the possibility of a long-term truce.

    3. some of the Hamas leaders have shown signs of becoming more moderate.

D) some of the Hamas leaders have already proved to have become more moderate.


  1. Depois de ler o parágrafo 7 - linhas 65 a 74 - sabe-se que a abordagem, com ênfase no gradualismo, do plano de paz “mapa do caminho”



A) provou-se defeituosa porque ambas as partes têm amplas razões para não confiar uma na outra.

B) provou-se acertada porque ambas as partes têm amplas razões para confiar integralmente uma na outra.

C) provou-se defeituosa porque ambas as partes têm amplas razôes para confiar integralmente uma na outra.

D) provou-se acertada porque ambas as partes têm amplas razões para não confiar uma na outra.



  1. In paragraph 8 – line 75 – the word tangible does not mean the same as




    1. concrete

    2. immaterial

    3. perceptible

D) definite

Inglês



PASSAGE TWO



Chances Are

RISK IS AN INESCAPABLE PART OF EVERY DECISION. For most of the everyday choices people make, the risks are small. But on a corporate scale, the implications (both upside and downside) can be enormous. Even the tritely expressed (and rarely encountered) win-win situation entails opportunity costs in the form of paths not taken.


To make good choices, companies must be able to calculate and manage the attendant risks. Today, myriad sophisticated tools can help them do so. But it was only a few hundred years ago that the risk management tool kit consisted of faith, hope, and guesswork. That’s because risk is a number’s game, and before the seventeenth century, humankind’s understanding of numbers wasn’t up to the task.

Most early numbering methods were unwieldy, as anyone knows who has tried to multiply XXIII by VI. The Hindu-Arabic numeral system (which, radically, included zero) simplified calculations and enticed philosophers to investigate the nature of numbers. The tale of our progression from those early fumblings with base 10 is masterfully told by Peter Bernstein in Against the Gods: The Remarkable Story of Risk.

Bernstein’s account begins in the dark days when people believed they had no control over events and so turned to priests and oracles for clues to what larger powers held in store for them. It progresses quickly to a new interest in mathematics and measurement, spurred, in part, by the growth of trade. During the Renaissance, scientists and mathematicians such as Girolamo Cardano mused about probability and concocted puzzles around games of chance. In 1494, a peripatetic Franciscan monk named Luca Pacioli proposed “the problem of points” – which asks how one should divide the stakes in an incomplete game. Some 150 years later, French mathematicians Blaise Pascal and Pierre de Fermat developed a way to determine the likelihood of each possible result of a simple game (balla, which had fascinated Pacioli).

But it wasn’t until the next century, when Swiss scholar Daniel Bernoulli took up the study of random events, that the scientific basis for risk management took shape.

Bernoulli (who also introduced the far-reaching concept of human capital) focused not on events themselves but on the human beings who desire or fear certain outcomes to a greater or lesser degree. His intent, he wrote, was to create mathematical tools that would allow anyone to “estimate his prospects from any risky undertaking in light of [his] specific financial circumstances.” In other words, given the chance of a particular outcome, how much are you willing to bet?

In the nineteenth century, other scientific disciplines became fodder for the risk thinkers. Carl Friedrich Gauss brought his geodesic and astronomical research to bear on the bell curve of normal distribution. The insatiably curious Francis Galton came up with the concept of regression to the mean while studying generations of sweet peas. (He later applied the principle to people, observing that few of the sons – and fewer of the grandsons – of eminent men were themselves eminent.)

But it wasn’t until after World War I that risk gained a beachhead in economic analysis. In 1921, Frank Knight distinguished between risk, when the probability of an outcome is possible to calculate (or is knowable), and uncertainty, when the probability of an outcome is not possible to determine (or is unknowable) – an argument that rendered insurance attractive and entrepreneurship, in Knight’s words, “tragic.” Some two decades later, John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern laid out the fundamentals of game theory, which deals in situations where people’s decisions are influenced by the unknowable decisions of “live variables” (aka other people) .

Today, of course, corporations try to know as much as is humanly and technologically possible, deploying such modern techniques as derivatives, scenario planning, business forecasting, and real options. But at a time when chaos so often triumphs over control, even centuries’ worth of mathematical discoveries can do only so much. Life “is a trap for logicians,” wrote the novelist G.K. Chesterton. “Its wildness lies in wait.”






INSTRUÇÕES
As questões a seguir são relativas ao conteúdo e ao significado do texto acima, após ter lido atentamente todo o texto, escolha a resposta correta para cada questão. As respostas devem ser todas baseadas no que é afirmado, ou está implícito, no texto. Lembre–se que somente UMA OPÇÃO é correta.



  1. In the Introduction to this article, the word tritely means in Portuguese




    1. banalmente

    2. raramente

    3. esporadicamente

    4. aleatoriamente


  1. Paragraph 1 – line 2 – the word myriad means




    1. too few to count

    2. too small to see

    3. too many to count

    4. too miniscule to see


  1. In paragraph 1 – lines 1 to 6 - faith, hope and guesswork were




    1. the risk management tool kit only a few decades ago.

    2. The sophisticated tools used to calculate and manage risks.

    3. The sophisticated tools that could not be used to calculate and manage risks.

    4. the risk management tool kit only a few hundred years ago.


  1. After having read paragraph 2 - lines 7 to 12 - you can see that




    1. the Hindu-Arabic numeral system was unwieldy.

    2. the Hindu-Arabic numeral system made calculations simpler.

    3. the Hindu-Arabic numeral system enticed philosophers to write Against the Gods: The Remarkable Story of Risk.

    4. the Hindu-Arabic numeral system did not include zero.


  1. Paragraph 3 - lines 13 to 23 - Bernstein’s account begins in the dark days when




    1. as pessoas tinham total controle sobre os acontecimentos e recorriam a sacerdotes e oráculos para ter idéia do que os poderes maiores reservavam para elas.

    2. as pessoas não tinham total controle sobre os acontecimentos e não tinham de recorrer a sacerdotes e oráculos para ter idéia do que os poderes maiores reservavam para elas.

    3. as pessoas acreditavam ter controle sobre os acontecimentos e não recorriam a sacerdotes ou a oráculos para ter idéia do que os poderes maiores reservavam para elas.

    4. as pessoas acreditavam não ter controle sobre os acontecimentos e recorriam a sacerdotes e oráculos para ter idéia do que os poderes maiores reservavam para elas.

6. Paragraph 3 - line 18 - the word puzzles has the same meaning as:



    1. riddles
    2. answers
    3. questions
              D) solutions




  1. Paragraph 4 - line 25 - the meaning in Portuguese of the expression random events is:



    1. acontecimentos previsíveis
    2. eventos randômicos
    3. certezas randômicas
    4. previsões acertadas



  1. Paragraph 5 - line 29 - the word outcomes means in Portuguese




    1. sucessos

    2. negações

    3. resultados

    4. afirmações



  1. Paragraph 7- line 48 - the verb deals in means in Portuguese



    1. faz negócios

    2. não interfere

    3. lida

    4. não influencia



  1. Paragraph 8 - line 52 - the word forecasting means in Portuguese:




    1. interrogação

    2. negativa

    3. afirmativa

    4. previsão



Inglês



PASSAGE THREE


The Last Word



Pervez Musharraf
Let’s Not Be Shortsighted’

P

5
RESIDENT PERVEZ MUSHARRAF OF PAKISTAN,a crucial U.S. ally, has a message for President George W. Bush: military action alone is not enough to win the war against Islamic extremism, he told NEWSWEEK’s Lally Weymouth. Speaking in the wake of recent U.S. bombing attacks in the north of his country against alleged Qaeda targets, the general diminished the importance of capturing or killing Osama bin Laden or Ayman al-Zawahiri, laying out a broader view of how to win the war on terror. Excerpts:



W

10
EYMOUTH: Last month the U.S. attacked Al Qaeda in the tribal areas of Pakistan. Was this attack coordinated with Pakistan?



M

15
usharraf:
This was definitely not coordinated with us. We condemn it and have objected to it as an issue of sovereignty. [But] we do know there are foreigners and Al Qaeda in that {area}… Let’s not play into the hands of extremists [who say] that sovereignty is only violated when someone comes by air.



If the U.S. has intelligence that a terror leader is hiding in a certain house, is there time for the U.S. and Pakistan to coordinate?

C


20
ertainly our capability is not as much as the U.S., but that doesn’t mean that we should allow U.S. forces to operate in Pakistan.

Will Osama bin Laden be found one day?

Possible, but very difficult.

Y

25
ou recently opened a dialogue with Israel, which was not popular with radical groups. Where is the relationship going and why is it good for Pakistan?

We are for the creation of a Palestinian homeland, although we accept Israel’s reality as a state. I feel we can contribute more strongly toward this cause if we are talking to Israel… And I think this pullout from Gaza was a major decision by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. We thought this needed to be encouraged.

H

30
ow do you see the new Indian government?

The relations with India have never been as good as they are today. We have got no tension, and there is no firing on the Line of Control.

You made a forward-looking proposal about self-governance for Kashmir.

I give proposals, and they don’t give counterproposals.



T

35
he Indians say they have not been more forthcoming because of cross-border violence in Bangalore and elsewhere in India by Pakistani-backed terror groups.



T

40
his is always the farce they use not to move forward. These are independent groups acting without any guidance or support from anyone, following their own agendas. Let’s demilitarise and give self-governance to the people of Kashmir. These [Indian soldiers] are there and kill so many civilians on the slightest of pretexts.



How do you feel you’re doing with the terror groups that tried to kill you?

Very well. They have all been eliminated. Either killed or arrested.



L

45
ashkar-i-Talba and Jaish-I-Mohammed wiped out?

They didn’t attack me. Whoever did was gone.

Don’t they change their names?

Y

50


es, they do change their names and they re-emerge… About six or eight months ago, we issued a list of all banned organizations and their leaders, about 380 or 390 of them. Now we have arrested about 50 percent of them, and the rest are underground.

People in America can’t understand why we can’t find Osama bin Laden.

B

55


ecause they don’t know the environment, that is why they don’t understand… There are very high mountains, between 10,000 to 15,000 feet, no communication infrastructure and some people abetting.

Do you think the U.S. understands the Muslim world?

Certainly there are a lot of holes in the West’s understanding.

Do you think President Bush has the right goal, which is to eliminate Al Qaeda?

T

60


he goal is correct, but it’s limited because military action is not an end in itself. Military action buys you time to utilize all other instruments to get to the core issues which are spawning terrorism… Having bought this time – what is the overall strategy? It is extremism that is important. Extremism is in the minds of people. It needs a totally different strategy.

W

65
hat is that strategy?

I

70
nternationally you have to address core issues. The military is not the ultimate answer – you can kill people [but] you are not going to achieve anything. People think, “Get Osama bin Laden and Zawahiri.” You get Osama and Zawahiri, OK, you kill them tomorrow, I can assure you [that] you will have achieved nothing. Let it be very clear.



Because you haven’t fought the real problem?

O

75


f course. You haven’t addressed the core issues. For heaven’s sake, let’s not be very shortsighted. These two people mean nothing. Do you think the man sitting in these inaccessible mountains is commanding what to do in Spain and London? You are sadly mistaken. So therefore, while Osama and Zawahiri have become symbols, that doesn’t mean that [if you kill] just these two, everything is hunky-dory in the world. There is no milk and honey flowing after you get these two people. Please understand that.



NEWSWEEK

Newsweekinternational.com



February 6, 2006
INSTRUÇÕES
As questões a seguir são relativas ao conteúdo e ao significado do texto acima, após ter lido atentamente todo o texto, escolha a resposta correta para cada questão. As respostas devem ser todas baseadas no que é afirmado, ou está implícito, no texto. Lembre–se que somente UMA OPÇÃO é correta.



  1. Paragraph 1 – lines 1 to 8 - What does the expression a crucial ally mean?




    1. A minor supporter

    2. An essential supporter

    3. A mighty opponent

    4. A minor opponent




  1. No parágrafo 1 – linas 1 a 8 – a expressão alleged Qaeda targets significa que




    1. os alvos eram realmente Qaeda

    2. os alvos não eram definitivamente Qaeda

    3. não se tem certeza se os alvos eram realmente Qaeda

    4. se tem certeza se os alvos não eram realmente Qaeda



  1. No parágrafo 3 - linhas 16 a 19 - o que a resposta do Presidente Musharraf significa?




    1. Que o Paquistão deveria permitir que os Estados Unidos operem dentro do país devido à superioridade militar americana.

    2. Que o Paquistão não deveria permitir que os Estados Unidos operem dentro do país, apesar de não existir superioridade militar americana.

    3. Que o Paquistão, forçosamente, deveria permitir que os Estados Unidos operem dentro do país devido à superioridade militar americana.

    4. Que o Paquistão não forçosamente deveria permitir que os Estados Unidos operem dentro do país, apesar da superioridade militar americana.



  1. Parágrafo 5 – linhas 22 a 28 - a frase we are for the creation of a Paletinian homeland, although we accept Israel’s reality as a state significa




    1. Que o governo do Paquistão é a favor da criação de uma pátria palestina, mas aceita Israel como um estado.

    2. Que o governo do Paquistão é contra a criação de uma pátria palestina mas aceita a realidade de Israel como um estado.

    3. Que o governo do Paquistão não é favor da criação de uma pátria palestina e também é contra a realidade de Israel como um estado.

    4. Que o governo do Paquistão é a favor da criação de uma pátria palestina mas não aceita a realidade de Israel como um estado.



  1. No parágrafo 8 – linha 34 – a palavra forthcoming quer dizer




    1. inatingível

    2. acessível

    3. passado

    4. inacessível




  1. In paragraph 8 - lines 34 to 41 - president Musharraf answers that




    1. the Indian government encourages the Pakistani government’s measures regarding Kashmir.

    2. the Indian government sees eye to eye with the Pakistani government the problems of Kashmir.

    3. the Indian government uses a farce not to go ahead with negotiations about Kashmir.

    4. the Indian government uses a farce to go ahead with negotiations about Kashmir.



  1. In paragraph 12 - line 54 – the verb abetting means



    1. refusing
    2. fighting
    3. challenging


D) helping


  1. Parágrafo 14 – linhas 57 e 59 – a palavra goal não significa

A) política


B) objetivo
C) propósito
D) finalidade

9. Paragraph 15 – line 65 - a synonym for the expression core issues is:



    1. dull numbers

    2. most important problems

    3. peripheral matters

    4. less important problems

10. Paragraph 16 – lines 70 to 77 – what does President Musharraf’s answer mean?



    1. That those two men sitting in the mountains have been telling terrorists what to do all over the world.

    2. Americans don’t have to understand that getting these two men will settle the problem of terrorism.

    3. Americans have to understand that getting these two men will not settle the problem of terrorism.

    4. That those two men sitting in the mountains make President Bush seem shortsighted.

KEY


(RESPOSTAS)



PASSAGE 1



D



A



B



C



A



D



B



C



A



B




PASSAGE 2



A



C



D



B



D



A



B



C



C



D




PASSAGE 3



B



C



D



A



B



C



D



A



B



C



Catálogo: sites
sites -> Lei n. º 796, de 05 de Maio de 1999
sites -> Contabilidade financeira, contabilidade de custos e contabilidade gerencial
sites -> Carta 389 Estado/Cidade
sites -> Projeto Nacional phpb-equipe Regional de São Paulo
sites -> Secretaria de estado da fazenda diretoria de contabilidade geral
sites -> Universidade Federal Rural de Pernambuco Superintendência de Gestão e Desenvolvimento de Pessoas
sites -> Estudo do plano nacional pela primeira infância contribuições das Instituições de Educação Infantil do Município de Sorocaba
sites -> Esclarecimentos solicitados por licitantes sobre o pregão presencial d-075/2010
sites -> Forum sobre Agricultura Familiar e Segurança Alimentar na cplp contribuições recebidas
sites -> Psicologia Analítica no Brasil, contribuições para a sua história


Compartilhe com seus amigos:


©principo.org 2019
enviar mensagem

    Página principal